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De b a t e  over providence, predestination, and grace led Catholic theologians of the early
modern period to formulations at once highly controversial and ingeniously construc­
tive. The “grace controversy” between the Jesuit Molinists and the Dominican Bahezians
was, according to Friedrich Stegmuller, “the most exciting and portentous event in the
modern history of Catholic theology and at the same time the grandiose conclusion to
a century churned up with religious ideas” (Stegmuller 1935, VII). The scene was set for
these debates by the papal condemnations of the teachings of Michel Baius (1513-89)
in 1567 and Cornelius Jansen the Younger (1585-1638) in 1653: the debates played out
between the poles of a neo-Pelagian concentration on the claims of integral human
nature before God, and the Augustinian concept of its utter dependence since the Fall
on the operation of salvific grace.
1 Th e  Th e o l o g i c a l  C o n n e c t i o n
b e t w e e n  P r o v i d e n c e , P r e d e s t i n a t i o n
a n d  G r a c e  i n  F r a n c i s c o  Su a r e z , SJ
Since the beginning of the sixteenth century, Catholic dogmatics has generally fol­
lowed the order of Thomas Aquinas’s (1225-74) Summa Theologiae. In his teach­
ing on God in the Prima Pars, Thomas devotes one question each to providence and
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predestination (I, q. 22-23). The doctrine of grace is treated at length in the Prima
Secundae (I—II, q. 109-14). The theologians of the early modern period retained these
separate contexts for the discussion of the three topics while, however, emphasizing the
connectedness of their subject matter and accentuating new aspects. This is exempli­
fied in the disputations of the Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548-1617). Suarez’s teaching on
God (1st ed. 1606), retains the close link between providence and predestination, but
clearly shifts the emphasis in favor of the latter. While he offers only a brief section on
providence at the end of the teaching on divine attributes (Suarez 1856-78, De deo uno
3.10 [1:231-35], he develops the topic of predestination in a separate treatise (Suarez
1856-78, De deo uno 3.10 [L236-532]) which, set between the treatment of God’s
being and attributes and the treatise on the Trinity, constitutes one of the three main
foci of his De deo uno et trino. In Suarez’s view, after the Holy Trinity only predesti­
nation can be adjudged a strictly supernatural subject of scholarly reflection on God
(Suarez 1856-78, De deo uno, Prooemium [I, XXIII]), the divine attributes and provi­
dence having been addressed in the metaphysical teaching on God (Suarez 1856-78,
Disputationes metaphysicae 30.14-17 [XXVI:i 65-224]). Suarez’s fundamental determi­
nations of providence and foreordination initially operate within an area of consensus
determined by the fathers, above all Augustine. By “providence” he understands God’s
plan for the entire universe, which unfolds as God guides the whole as well as every
particular toward the goals he intends for them (Marschler 2013, 32-40). He ascribes
great importance to the distinction between “natural” and “moral” providence: the
former applies to all creatures and includes the conservation of being granted by God
and the divine concursus in all creaturely activity; the latter concerns only angels and
human beings to the extent that they are beings who pursue the goal of their existence
in freedom. It finds expression in “commandments, words of advice, promises, threats,
rewards and punishments” (Suarez 1856-78, De deo uno 3.10.7 [1:232b]), thus point­
ing beyond philosophical deliberation to the sphere of free divine acts of revelation.
Providence is an expression of God’s sovereign and just dominion but also of his good­
ness and wisdom. Knowing and willing conjoin in its constitution (Suarez 1856-78, De
deo uno3.10.10 [1:233b]).
In his freedom, God decided to open up a goal to rational creatures, transcending
the capacity of their nature as established in creation and orienting them towards eter­
nal life (Suarez 1856-78, De praedestinatione 1.1.6 [1:237b]; 1.4.5 [1:243b]). In God this
goal is presupposed from all eternity as a certain determination, whereas according to
the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Denzinger and Hunermann 2010,1540.1565-66),
it normally remains hidden from the creature (Suarez 1856-78, De praedestinatione
1.3.5 [1:240a]). Since in predestination the path, the necessary means by which the goal
can be reached, and the goal itself are fixed (Suarez 1856-78, De praed. 15.5.15 [1:248b),
predestination can be regarded as part of providence (on the more exact definition
of the relationship, see Suarez 1856-78, De praed. 1.15 [I:305a-309b]). This points to
the supernatural dimension of providence, thus enabling a (theological) solution
to many difficult problems (for example, the suffering of many of the just on earth)
(Suarez 1856-78, De deo uno 3.10.14 [1:234b]). Predestination, however, takes into
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consideration the aspect of the choice of goal, whereas providence is oriented more
towards obtaining the right means of reaching it (Suarez 1856-78, De praed. 15.5.17
[I:249a]).
Alongside the question of how, on Gods part, intellect and will work together in the
act of predestination, the theological schools asked how this certain goal of human exis­
tence can be reconciled with the unimpaired reality of creaturely freedom. This topic
links the treatises on predestination and grace. If grace (understood as gratia creata) is
the means through which God makes possible the orientation and election of created
beings to eternal life during their earthly existence, the relationship of grace to predes­
tination is like that of created, temporal effects to their uncreated, eternal cause (Suarez
1856-78, De praed. 1.19 [I:3O9b-3i3b]). Accordingly, the independent treatise de gratia
deals with God in his activity of sanctification and illustrates central attributes of God
from the perspective of their manifestation in salvation history (Suarez 1856-78, De
gratia, Prooem. [VII, p. IX-X]). Suarezs teaching on grace has also been considerably
developed beyond Aquinas’s text. Originally filling three folio volumes, this is the most
elaborate of Suarezs theological works (Scorraille 1917,2:377).
Suarez begins with six detailed prolegomena in which he treats systematic and his­
torical presuppositions of his topic. The first two parts, on free will as the “foundation of
grace” (Suarez 1856-78, De gratia, no. 7 [VII, p. XI—XII]) and on divine foreknowledge,
point toward controversial questions of the times. The subsequent division of the trea­
tise according to actual and habitual grace (Suarez 1856-78, De gratia, lib. I-V/VI-XI),
the roots of which lie in the fourteenth century but are now theologically differentiated
and consolidated, continued to shape the Catholic treatise on grace until well into the
twentieth century. Whereas the major questions de auxiliis are discussed in the first
part (the need for divine grace in the natural and supernatural spheres, the distinction
between sufficient and efficacious grace in the interplay with human freedom), the sec­
ond section contains the thorny debates about justification, the nature of salvific grace
and merit, and the final perseverance of the recipient of grace, classifying them as prob­
lems already present in the texts of the Council of Trent.
The publication history of Suarez’s De gratia illustrates the explosive nature of debates
on the theology of grace at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the last years
of his life, the Jesuit had sought permission in Rome to be allowed to publish his work
De auxiliis. In April 1617, a few months before his death, a letter reached him written
by Cardinal Scipione Borghese in the name of the pope, forbidding the publication
(Scorraille 1917, 2:234f.). Whereas the first and third volumes of Suarezs teaching on
grace were published soon after his death in 1619, it was over three decades before the
third part, De auxiliis, also became publicly available in Lyons in 1654 as a result of a
private initiative and without the consent of the Jesuit Order (Scorraille 1917, 2:398ff).
Thus even Suarez was not able to escape the strict ruling of the decree of August 28,
1607, a dilatory decision by Paul V (1552-1621) that put an end to inconclusive disputa­
tions concerning the compatibility of God’s grace with human freedom. It was not until
the Jansenist debates of the mid-seventeenth century that this decision, supported by
a “decree of the Inquisition of 1 December 1611 forbidding all further writings on the
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doctrine of grace unless they were expressly authorized by the Holy Office” (Pastor 1927,
180), was gradually relativized.
2  Th e  C e n t r a l  P o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e
“G r a c e  C o n t r o v e r s y ”
The “grace controversy” which unfolded following the publication of the Dominican
Domingo Banez’s (1528-1604) commentaries on the Prima and Prima Secundae
(Salamanca 1584) and the Jesuit Luis de Molinas (1535-1600) “Concordia liberi arbit-
rii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione”
(Lisbon 1588) went on for two decades (see the overview in Stegmuller i960). We exam­
ine the theological alternatives that were debated in the Disputationes de auxiliis.
2.1 The common theological foundation
The competing theses of the theological schools in the field of providence, predestina­
tion, and grace can only be correctly classified if one bears in mind the shared framework
of theological premises within which they were expressed. The theology of Augustine
served as an undisputed basis which was never questioned, not even in the arguments
with the Reformers. The debates de auxiliis were in large part a struggle for interpreta-
tional hegemony in the exegesis of Augustine’s texts. Thus the terms of reference for all
the schemes included the doctrines of original sin; infallible predestination; the neces­
sity, gratuity and priority of grace; and the conviction that God does not move man
merely “extrinsically” with his grace but also (and predominantly) “intrinsically.” Taken
over from medieval Scholasticism and deepened were both the metaphysical analysis of
gratia (interna) creata and the thesis of the essentially supranatural character of grace
and of the theological virtues. From the sixteenth century onward, theology had to face
up to a new challenge from the reformers’ theology of grace, above all from Luther’s
concept of freedom, his theses on the preparation and nature of justification or on the
assurance of salvation, and also from Calvin’s doctrine of predestination. The answers
given in the Council of Trent’s 1547 Decree on Justification constituted for all Catholic
authors the authoritative template for the tracts on grace. Against Luther, the convic­
tion was defended that original sin did not completely destroy man’s ability to produce
morally good acts even without divine grace. Since, however, the Council of Trent had
taught that even those justified by God required the help of a “special grace” in order to
persevere in the good (Denzinger and Hiinermann 2010,1541.1572), doubt was raised
concerning the sinner’s ability to perform good deeds on a permanent and unqualified
basis. Subtle debates were conducted on the exact extent of the remaining freedom for
good (for example, in fulfilling the requirements of natural law) and its dependence on
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divine assistance. This already touches on the central issue of the early modern theology
of grace: how is the relationship between divine grace and human freedom to be deter­
mined? In the following we shall try to shed light on the two most important attempts at
an answer.
2.2 Báñezian Thomism
There is one fundamental theological-metaphysical conviction at the heart of the the­
ology of grace put forward in the seventeenth century Thomist school since Domingo
Báñez: God is the cause of every motion and change in the universe, not only because
he is the “unmoved mover” at the beginning of creation, but also because he subse­
quently enables and supports every action of his creatures. The human will is no excep­
tion. When it transitions from potency to act, it requires a cause for the determination
that is thereby accomplished (Alvarez 1611, 64b Garrigou-Lagrange 1936, 51 et passim).
The will’s dependency on God for being and motion exemplifies the esse ab alio as the
fundamental determination of every created being (as distinct from the divine actus
purus) (Alvarez 1611,1.9, disp. 96 [763]). This causal premotion, which is more than a
mere moral stimulus on God’s part, is called by the Thomists praemotio/praedetermina-
tio physica. Initially controversial, these terms were accepted in the course of the debate,
even as being synonymous (Hübener 1989). God’s eternally established sovereignty,
which manifests itself in the causal prae of his willing and acting towards creation, is
particularly visible in the supernatural sphere. Creaturely freedom can only orient
itself to its eternal goal if it is antecedently elevated; that is, made capable of such acts
by God himself. The distinction between efficacious and (merely) sufficient grace can­
not, according to the Thomist model, be determined “extrinsically” through the deci­
sion of the creature, but must come ab intrínseco, from God’s grace itself. God is in no
way dependent on the creature—not even on the level of his own foreknowledge of the
creature’s free decisions. This makes it clear how man’s free collaboration with the divine
impulse of grace is to be understood. It cannot possibly be a matter of combining two
“competing” partial causes. Rather, God and free will are each to be regarded as total
causes, albeit on two levels which must be strictly separated from one another: God is
the primal cause, human freedom the secondary (and thus at the same time immedi­
ate) cause of all the acts it performs: as itself human freedom effects that which God has
in advance made it capable of (Alvarez 1611,1.9, disp. 98 [779 f  ]): “to predetermine’ . . .
means nothing other than to cause the will to determine itself; as physically premov­
ing the free will means nothing other than bringing about truly effectively, through an
inwardly approaching motion, that this will moves itself” (Alvarez 1611, I.9, disp. 91
[731]). As Aquinas taught, God moves all things in accordance with their nature: natural
things in a natural manner, free ones in keeping with their freedom (Alvarez 1611,1.3,
disp. 18-23 [138-233]). Thus God’s moving the free will towards himself as the highest
good does not inflict any coercion on the human being, even as it defines the doctrine of
predetermination: God alone can be the inner motive principle of the human will; even
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the angels and demons, as the highest created powers, can only ever influence man’s will
from outside.
This basic metaphysical-theological principle resulted in a particular understanding
of human freedom (Alvarez 1611,1.12, disp. 115 [914-22]). It rejects the Molinist defini­
tion that regards free will as presupposing all the factors necessary for acting; namely,
the capacity to act or not to act or to do either one thing or another. For the Thomists, the
combination of the determining factors of “presence of all the necessary prerequisites
for acting” with “indeterminateness” is an unacceptable contradiction. In their opinion,
the praerequisita ad operandum include the causal predetermination of the will to con­
crete action (in the context of the theology of grace, through God’s efficacious grace).
The capacity of willing does not “simultaneously” (in sensu composite) possess the indif­
ference also to do the opposite. This indeterminateness can only be admitted in sensu
diviso: the will could, in a differently determined act, also do the opposite of what it has
now decided to do. The Thomists see this as satisfying the insistence of the Council of
Trent that the human being receiving the call to God’s grace can also resist it (Alvarez
1611,1.9, disp. 92 [743f ]). Behind this lies a highly intellectualized definition of freedom
that sees its innermost ground as lying in the indifference of practical reason toward all
finite goods, which as such are incapable of unequivocally determining a will that is ori­
entated towards the good in general.
Freedom is the capacity of the will and of reason to realize in action one of two pos­
sibilities or to refrain from acting. Although freedom subsists formally in the will as
its proximate and immediate subject, with respect to its roots and foundations it nev­
ertheless lies in the intellect. For it is founded and rooted in the indifference of the
judgement through which the intellect judges that an object, which the will imagines
must be loved, does not possess a necessary or natural connection with the univer­
sal good to which the will is naturally orientated, that is, as regards its specification.
(Alvarez 1611,1.9, disp. 92, no. 7 [918])
The directly determined will remains free in its roots to the extent that this indiffer­
ence in judging is preserved, even when the will has committed itself with an action.
And when God as the highest good fixes the will in himself, the unique case arises that
the human being is relieved through grace of the otherwise insurmountable tension
between the infinite reaching of the will and the finite choice of goods that cannot satisfy
it. God binds the will to himself as the infinite good, which means that human striv­
ing can come to rest even though for the creature the certainty of this rest is not the
result of seeing it directly but only the perception in faith shaped by love. “Not being able
to resist this, indeed not even being able to desire to, is no impairment of freedom but
rather its fulfilment” (Ramelow 1997,49). Thus in one crucial point those given grace on
earth already resemble those given bliss in heaven, whose freedom is not decreased, but
rather perfected, by no longer being able to turn away deliberately from God. For the
Thomists, the doctrine of the physical predetermination of the will is the crucial argu­
ment for God’s being able in his decree to foresee with certainty from all eternity man’s
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free decisions and, on the basis of this knowledge, to direct the world according to his
plan. If Gods grace enables human beings to act (as he intends), it becomes superfluous
to ask whether these plans can be thwarted by the creatures resistance.
Although the Thomist approach is convincing in its systematic coherence, it is bur­
dened with three closely related problems. One is formulated in the question of why
God, in view of his role as universal mover, cannot also be regarded as the direct origi­
nator of human sin. Is the withholding of efficacious grace not responsible for a human
being not repenting, in other words sinning? The problem seems to be exacerbated by
the fact that leading Thomists equate this refusal of grace with a “blinding” or “hard­
ening” of the sinner by God. Admittedly, they do add by way of explanation that the
unwillingness of the human being himself remains the true cause of his failure to repent.
God is in no way obliged to put an end to this state of affairs through his gift of grace.
This refusal can be explained with the doctrine of original sin; but then at the very least
the sin of the first human being still remains in need of an explanation.
The second query points to the possibility of distinguishing between sufficient
and efficacious grace, a distinction that seems to be canceled in the Thomist system.
Alongside a grace that is of itself infallibly successful, one that is conditionally effica­
cious is in danger of becoming a meaningless concept—since apart from God there is
not supposed to be any cause that could actualize the mere possibility of sufficiency
(Alvarez 1611,1.9, disp. 102 [808-13]). The Thomists’ sufficient grace does from a human
perspective contain an objectively real but subjectively unattainable potential; it lies
within the power of the sinner only to deny himself this, thus making it ineffective. From
God’s perspective it belongs on the plane of a willing that has never really been realized
(the voluntas antecedens as opposed to the voluntas consequens), the relevance of which
can be doubted.
Third and finally, it remains unclear whether the Thomist approach is able to do
adequate justice to the biblical teaching of God’s universal salvific will. If divine pre­
destination points to an absolute decree, the enforcement of which takes place by
means of an infallibly efficacious gift of grace, the rejection of certain people seems
likewise to have to be ascribed to a positive act of will on God’s part from all eternity
(Alvarez 1611, Ln, disp. 109 [856]). This, too, is not performed conditionally by God
(referring to a person’s foreseen demerit or refusal), but absolutely (Alvarez 1611,1.11,
disp. no, no. 9 [866]). For the rejected, the lack of grace is thus to be considered the
formal effect of divine reprobation for which no cause is to be discerned beyond the
divine will (on the background, see Stiglmayr 1964). Critics have always seen there
to be a great danger of this view leading to the concept of double predestination. The
Thomists themselves point to the insoluble mystery of the co-existence of divine
mercy and justice:
The fact that of two people who are preven iently moved by the same movement of
grace one consents and cooperates with the grace, decides on a pious act and is con­
verted, whereas the other persists in sin, cannot be ascribed to the pure, naturally
indwelling, specific and interior freedom common to both the good and the bad, the
96 THOMAS MARSCHLER
reprobate and the elect; instead, the fact that one is converted must be ascribed to the
absolute and efficacious decree of God, who wanted in his mercy to convert him and
meet his needs with the effective help of his preveniently efficacious grace, whereas
he [God] justly left the other in the mass of perdition with the help of merely suffi­
cient grace. (Alvarez 1611,I.9, disp. 97 [774])
Whether the “strict Thomists” of the seventeenth century actually renewed or falsified
the pure teaching of the Doctor angelicas with their system of grace was a matter of con­
tentious dispute for centuries. Since the end of neo-Thomism as the ideal in Catholic
theology shortly after Vatican II (1962-65), it has become easier to acknowledge the
newness of the emphases introduced by Banezianism:
In a strange interpenetration of the Thomist idea of order (the ordo universalis must
be realized in the display of God’s mercy and justice; paradoxically even the permit­
ting of evil serves this ordo), Scotist Voluntarism (determining goals or aims before
means; explaining predestination through the “ab aeterno” of the divine, absolutely
efficacious willing; according to the Bahezians election and reprobation are indeed
acts of the intellect, but presuppose an act of will) and the thinking of St Augustine,
which still takes its bearings from Holy Scripture (Jacob and Esau in their grace or
reprobation represent a type of all election or rejection), an election is taught that
precedes any decision on the part of the creature (praedestinatio ante praevisa mer-
ita). (Stiglmayr 1964,159O
The Thomists after Vincent Contenson (1641-74) themselves clearly moderated the
teaching on the restriction of sufficient grace, as is already apparent in the theology
courses of the Salmanticenses and then in Billuart (1658-1757) (Flynn 1938). Alongside a
recognition of the objective problems of the thesis, this probably came about as a result
of the Jansenist controversy and the doctrinal concessions of the congruist Molinists
(Stiglmayr 1964,162-67).
2.3 Molinism
“Molinism” is, as research over the past hundred years has shown, undoubtedly even
more of a problematic catch-all term than “Banezianism”. “If a Molinist is understood
to be someone who agreed with all of Molina’s theses, then there were no Molinists
except Molina,” is Klaus Reinhardt’s hyperbolic comment (Reinhardt 1965,241). Thus
the concept remains usable only as a vague general term that brackets together cer­
tain majority theses within Jesuit theology since the end of the sixteenth century on
how to determine the relationship between divine grace and creaturely freedom. It
has long since been established that the historical origins of these theses are not to
be associated exclusively with Molina’s name and that the teachings of his Concordia
were considerably modified by the Jesuits in subsequent decades (see already Lurz
1932,36.218).
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The undisputed fundamental conviction of the seventeenth-century Jesuit school is
the rejection of a physical predetermination of human freedom by a God issuing univer­
sally effective decrees in both the natural and supernatural spheres. In their definition of
freedom, Molinists claim what was rejected by the Thomists: “That agent is called ‘free
who, with all the prerequisites for acting having been posited, is able to act and is able
not to act, or is able to do one thing in such a way that he is also able to do some contrary
thing” (Molina 1953, p. 1, disp. 2, n. 3 [14,I:8ff]). If creaturely freedom has to be defined
as an underivable and spontaneous capacity for self-determination that is incompat­
ible not merely with coercion but also with necessity, then it cannot—either in its actual
enactment or in the determination therein fulfilled—be traceable completely to a causal
impulse from God. This option has been seen as the translation of the decision-centered
practice of Ignatian spirituality into theology (Reinhardt 1965, 219), but even more as
an attempt to effectively defend the Catholic dogma against the Lutheran concept of
servum arbitrium. Philosophically, Molina builds on Scotus (Molina 1953, p. 1, disp. 24,
n. 8 [157]). Like him, Molina denies neither the necessity of the concursus Dei generalis
nor the need for divine grace in order for supernatural acts to come about. He confirms
the antecedence of God’s gracious action, taken in the Augustinian sense of the interna
vocatio Dei (God’s internal calling) directed to man’s intellect and will, and also affirms
man’s inability to bestow a supernatural quality on his acts by his own freedom. But at
the same time Molina is convinced that God never wants to bypass human freedom with
his gracious action. As a rule, God does not give someone an inner vocation if that per­
son has not previously been reached by the Church’s proclamation of the faith (Molina
i953> P -d isp . 9, n. 4-6 [45]); and the prevenient grace only becomes effective as a moral
impulse when the assent of the human will is present. If, therefore, of two people to
whom the Gospel has been preached one repents and the other does not, this must not
be attributed to the inefficacy of the grace as such, because grace is not “the sole and
complete cause of assent to faith” (Molina 1953, p. 1, disp. 12, n. 1 [56,1:17]). Rather, the
prevenient grace approaching the human being from outside and our free decision to
collaborate with it work together as two parts of a universal cause in the one indivisible
supernatural act; it is only our analytical minds that make a distinction between them.
This is where Molina’s famous metaphor belongs of the “two pulling a ship” (Molina
1953, p. 2, disp. 26, n. 15 [170,1:30]): our free consent or cooperation is the reason for the
difference between efficacious as opposed to sufficient grace (Molina 1953, p. 3, disp. 40,
n. 11-12 [249f] ); conversely, it is the creature’s refusal that prevents the supernatural act
from coming about.
Molinism attempts to explain how, given these premises, one can speak of a predes­
tination by God that is one from all eternity with the foreknown efficacy of his grace.
Molina developed this over the two decades preceding the publication of the Concordia,
at about the same time as his confrère Pedro de Fonseca (1528-99). The crucial element
is that he approaches it from God’s foreknowledge. Alongside the “natural-necessary”
knowledge that applies to everything in God’s power (irrespective of its realization)
and the “free” knowledge that refers to what is actually existing and arises from God’s
decrees, Molina here distinguishes a third form, namely “middle knowledge”: “With
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this, God, with his supreme and inscrutable knowledge of the essential being of every
free will, has seen what this [i.e., free will] would do according to its inherent freedom if
it were to find itself in this or that order or even in an infinite number of orders of things
even though it could, on the other hand, if it so wished, actually do the opposite” (Molina
1953, P- 4> disp. 52, n. 9 [540]). God knows in advance certainly and infallibly, together
with the free decrees of his will, all the possible contingent circumstances determined by
free actions of creatures (free secondary causes)—including those that are never in fact
realized. This implies a prior vision of the free decisions of creatures that takes place in
these circumstances.
Among the preconditions of creaturely acts are the external or internal impulses of
grace received from God. But although God foreknows under what conditions certain
human beings will cooperate with grace and obtain merits, he does not declare the
merits to be the cause of God’s infallible predestination. “The foreseen merits are not
the medium propter quod but the medium per quod et sine quo non. The infallibility of
predestination lies not in the nature of the graces but rather in God’s foreknowledge”
(Reinhardt 1965, i88f). On the basis of his antecedent knowledge of the possible worlds
and the actions of the creatures in them, God freely decides by a universal decree in
favor of a single real world, whose course he can survey and in which his gifts of grace
are so attuned to the conditionally foreseen free decisions of the creatures that his goals
will be achieved. “The concept of ‘possible worlds’ undoubtedly expanded the specu­
lative scope of the possible. However, in its actual function, it served to speculatively
reduce the scope of the practical possibilities that human freedom opens up and to
make them readily comprehensible—for God and for the philosopher who wants to
understand the conditions pertaining to the possibility of divine freedom in knowl­
edge and action” (Ramelow 1997,47). The further discussion of Molina’s solution inside
and outside the Jesuit school highlights some of the difficulties that confronted his
theses. Thomists saw the scientia media hypothesis as doomed to failure in its attempt
to safeguard God’s certain knowledge of the free acts of human beings without physi­
cal predetermination, since in view of the contingency of the causes, the truth value
of statements about something conditionally future remains uncertain. What can­
not be called true “with certainty” could, with Aristotle, be qualified as not knowable
(even by God) (Alvarez 1611,1.2, disp. 7, n. 17 [8of ]). While Molina expressed himself
clearly in favor of an indeterminateness of the future contingents because he saw this
as being the only way of guaranteeing human freedom, after him a growing majority
of Jesuits affirmed “the fixed truth value of singular propositions about future contin­
gents” (Knebel 1991, 270), employing more strongly nominalist explanations side by
side with realistically oriented ones (Reinhardt 1965,104-27; Ramelow 1997, 93-123).
What proved even more complicated was the question of the medium of God’s cogni­
tion in the case of his “middle knowledge.” Basically, the theologians were faced with
the possibility of contemplating an either extra-divine or inner-divine medium quo
(Lurz 1932, 84-116; Reinhardt 1965,132-44). If an eternal existence of things “beside”
God is excluded, the contingent future events themselves can be considered a possible
medium of knowledge. In taking this path, which was pioneered by some Nominalists,
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one is again confronted with the uncertain truth value of propositions concerning
it and its possible dependence on divine knowledge itself. If, on the other hand, one
attempts to ground the scientia media in God’s knowledge of the creaturely second­
ary causes that bring it about, it can be objected that either it would have to be pos­
sible to deduce their free decisions with certainty from the circumstances of their acts
(which would amount to a deterministic reduction of freedom; Garrigou-Lagrange
1936, 68), or that they enable God to make a (perhaps very good, but never certain)
prognosis only of the probability of their future acts. Gregory of Valencia (1549-1603)
tried to solve the problem with the novel thesis of a preparatory and virtual indepen­
dent decision on the part of the human will, which God could know in advance as
regards the concrete decision (Hentrich 1928). Speculations as to God’s insight into the
“moral necessity” to which decisions of the human will maybe subject remained popu­
lar among other Jesuits of the time (Knebel 2000, i9off, 223f and passim). In the sec­
ond major paradigm for a solution that points to a medium of knowledge within God
in order to illustrate his apprehension of the futura conditionata, the recourse to the
will of God is excluded for the opponents of strong predefinition models. Consequently,
only God’s essence can be assumed to be the medium to the extent that it causes the
reality of the creature or (merely) makes it knowable for God as in a mirror. Molina
had been thinking along these lines when he pointed to the “divine intellect’s unlim­
ited power of representation vis-à-vis its object,” to God’s supercomprehensio, through
which “the knowledge of a contingent object [becomes] ex parte subjecti necessary
knowledge” (Ramelow 1997, 228). Many later Jesuits continued with this approach and
modified it; Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) and Martin Esparza (1606-89), for example,
speak of an “intentional pre-existence” of the conditional truths in the divine eternity
(Ramelow 1997, 2O2f, 222Í). But does this path lead out of the circular argument that
arises when a creature’s assent to divine grace is meant to provide the ground for con­
ditional knowledge of this assent and thus also for the actual gift of grace, whereas at
the same time it is divine grace in the first place that makes the real existence of the
creature’s assent possible, and this in turn is ontologically identical with the conditional
assent on which the scientia media depends (Knebel 1991, 279, n. 100)? In the end, all
that is left is to speak of (with Bernaldo de Quiros and Aldrete) is a mutua causalitas
(Ramelow 1997,262), which sets out rather than resolves the problem. This, too, proved
incapable of refuting the charge that a predestination constructed with the help of sci­
entia media calculations radically neutralizes what is proper to creaturely freedom
because it makes the biographies of free creatures look in God’s eternal knowledge like
abstractly definable ideas. When, shortly before the middle of the seventeenth century,
the Suárez school campaigned for the existence—repudiated by Molina himself—of
a scientia media reflexa, in which God also knows prospectively how he will possibly
act given conditional future events, theological discourse turned more and more into
planning a strategy, conceived on God’s behalf, with the aim of immunizing his provi­
dential plans as skillfully as possible against all “disruptions” on the part of creaturely
freedom (Ramelow 1997, 263-69). It did not escape the notice of the opponents of this
expansion of the theory that assuming God’s knowledge of his own decrees before he
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issued them threatened to stifle not only creaturely but also divine freedom in calcula­
tions of necessity (Ramelow 1997,266f).
A second main objection from the Thomists had accused Molinas approach of bring­
ing God into a problematic dependency relationship vis-à-vis his creatures, in that his
predestination was seen as a reaction to (albeit hypothetical) free decisions on the part
of these creatures (Alvarez, 1.12, disp. 121, n. 2 [960]). In fact, the Jesuit had taken into
account the “overall balance” of God’s middle knowledge with respect to his decision
in favor of one of the countless possible worlds, and had thus made the predestination
of the individual, which occurs together with the choice of a certain order, logically
coordinate or subordinate to God’s foreseeing of his merits. This line of argument was
pursued explicitly by the Jesuit Leonardus Lessius (1554-1623) in his treatise on grace,
first published in 1610. This book provoked major controversies within the Society of
Jesus, the course of which has been documented in detail by Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet
(Le Bachelet 1931). Lessius’s most important critics within his own order were Robert
Bellarmine (1542-1621) and Francisco Suarez with their own model of grace, which was
later called “Congruism”. Aquaviva (1543-1615), the general of the order, soon also joined
in the argument over Lessius’s book, as did several leading Dominican theologians. In
1611 it spread as far as Pope Paul V, who feared a rekindling of the recently concluded
debates De auxiliis. Despite all the hostility, Lessius scarcely departed from his core
theses. On December 14,1613, Aquaviva put an end to the controversy with his practi­
cal, not speculatively oriented decree that obliged all Jesuits to adhere to the Congruist
thesis (Le Bachelet 2:236-45). His influence is to be seen among leading Jesuits such as
Arriaga (1592-1667), Tanner (1572-1632), or Ruiz de Montoya (1562-1632). Through the
republication of his book on grace (1626), Lessius himself also maintained a presence
in the ongoing debate up to and beyond his death in 1623. Aquaviva’s decree was never
formally revised, but in practice decreased in relevance as the contexts of the discussion
changed (Le Bachelet 2:382-85).
The crucial difference between strict Molinism and Congruism lies in the fact that
the latter speaks of a distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace in actu primo
by giving strictly intrinsic, not extrinsic reasons for the efficacy of grace. God distrib­
utes his graces in a targeted manner and does not “scatter them around” (Ramelow 1997,
275), because he knows for whom the power of these gifts, which is sufficient for every­
one, will in fact actually become effective. He brings into reality the world that he has
foreseen as possible qua scientia media and in which precisely those achieve salvation
whom he determined for this, prior to their merits (ante praevisa mérita). This distinc­
tion took account of the criticism of the Dominicans, who, in Augustinian tradition,
strictly rejected a reason for predestination in man, as well as the reference from within
their own order to General Borja’s 1565 Ratio Studiorum (Reinhardt 1965, 219(f). For the
Congruists, God’s original praedilectio thus achieves the same effect on a human being
through a moral influence as the physically efficacious grace of Thomism. As Knebel has
pointed out, in the Congruist calculation human decisions made under the influence of
grace, as God apprehends them in advance in his scientia media, are treated in a fairly
standardized, atomized, and serial manner, being seen mechanistically almost like the
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output of “supernatural mass production” (Knebel 2000,172; Knebel 2007,15O. From this
there evolved a praxis model with a “completely means-end rationality” (Knebel 1991,
290). Although the pluralization of the Congruist scientia media calculation led in some
authors to a renewed desire for a synthesizing meta-reflection—as documented, for
example, in Antonio Perezs concept of a scientia media universalissima (Ramelow 1997,
90-93)—the concentration on the individual case nevertheless remains evident. The
formal unconditionality of individual freedom remains constant throughout the course
of every action and is, according to Gods providential plan, guided through a finite
sequence of concrete decision-making situations in such a way that in the end the goal
intended by God is reached. Only the idea of a creatura rebellis that rejects every divine
grace in all possible worlds remains a problem that even the subtlest Congruist scheme
finds hard to eliminate. It is here that we get the clearest confirmation of the thesis boldly
formulated by individual Jesuits that God has given his omnipotence into the hand of our
free will (Knebel 2000,186, n. 262, pointing to passages in Izquierdo and Mauro).
Over the course of time there have been clear changes in the verdicts on whether the
continuity rather than the difference between Molina and Suarez should be empha­
sized, and whether the road from one to the other is to be regarded as one of progress
or decline from the original scientia media. The older Jesuits pursued a noticeable
interest in playing down the differences between Molinism and Congruism (see, e.g.,
Schneemann 1881), and the increasing convergence between the Society of Jesus and
the Thomist tradition was even accounted by some interpreters to be “the greatest prog­
ress in the history of Molinism” (Lurz 1932, 223). In more recent times, however, the
“moral-external” determination of man in Congruism and the “physical-intrinsic” in
Thomism have quite frequently been categorized as equally problematic attacks on
human freedom—combined with the call for consideration to be given to fundamen­
tally new ways of explaining the relationship between nature and grace (Greiner 2011).
3 A Br i e f  Re t r o s p e c t i v e
The early modern struggle over grace and predestination has—like the Scholasticism
of the period as a whole—received largely negative, at times almost pitying assessments
in later times. It has been seen as the sad squandering of great intellectual potential, a
getting bogged down in frightful subtleties and proof of an inability to be innovative
in crossing the narrow boundaries of a paradigm that offered nothing more to discuss.
The neo-Thomism of the early twentieth century attempted to unveil Molina as noth­
ing less than the forefather of the “anthropological turn” that reached its zenith in Kant;
whereas the Jesuits tried in a similarly one-sided manner to emphasize Molinas fidel­
ity to Aquinas. With the rise in twentieth-century Catholic theology of a subject- and
freedom-oriented way of thinking, the Molinist heritage was generally rated consider­
ably more highly, whereas Banezian Thomism has found hardly any defenders. Down to
the most recent debate on the analytical philosophy of religion, Molinism has remained
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present as an option to be taken seriously, albeit leaving out the theological dimension of
grace (Perszyk 2012).
Undeniably, Molinism aims at a separation between a natural structure in which God
can intervene at any time and a sphere of creaturely freedom that is inviolable even for
God, and to which he only has access through the back door of his prior knowledge. The
unique nature of the esse morale is discovered and celebrated here, but at the same time
the groundwork is laid for the modern diastasis between nature and freedom, which
manifests itself definitively in Kant. In his important research, Knebel has pointed to
further connections that have crossed over, often unrecognized, from the Jesuit school
into modern philosophy. In the treatise on grace, for example, the beginnings are to be
found of the optimism debate so central for Leibniz, as well as the development of highly
complex discourses on a “statistical paradigm of moral necessity” (Knebel 2000, 275-
486; Ramelow 1997,123-30), with which the essentially unfathomable factual truth that
grace-filled people do sin is made rationally comprehensible. Linked with the concept
of moral necessity is a pointer “to the fact that the world also works reliably in the realm
of events that are dependent on the free will” (Knebel 2000, 557); that is, it is rationally
predictable. The scientia media hypothesis attempts in this way to resolve the problem,
which had been virulent since Scotus and unavoidable for Aristotelian-type episte­
mology, of how to reconcile creaturely contingency with the theological discourse on
necessity (Knebel 2007, i7f). Even though it would hardly be likely to make any sense
to present the whole of modern philosophical thinking as a reception history of the
Banezian-Molinist disagreements (against Ocana Garcia 2000), the above-mentioned
points of contact with the early modern doctrine of grace have ensured the contin­
ued interest in it by philosophical interpreters right down to the present day, whereas
scarcely any notice is taken of it in contemporary theology.
B i b l i o g r a p h y
Alvarez, Diego, OP. 1611. De auxiliis divinaegratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libértate. Lyon.
Báñez, Domingo, OP. 1614. Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Doctoris Angelici D.
Thomae usque ad sexagesimam quartam quaestionem complectentia. Douai.
Denzinger, Heinrich, and Peter Hünermann, eds. 2010. Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse
und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen/Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum
de rebus fidei et morum. 43rd ed. Freiburg: Herder.
Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald. 1936. “Prémotion physique.” In Dictionnaire de Théologie
Catholique, vol. XIII/i, 31-77. Paris: Letouzey.
Greiner, Michael. 2011. “Gottes wirksame Gnade und menschliche Freiheit. Wiederaufnahme
eines verdrängten Schlüsselproblems.” In Theologische Anthropologie, edited by Thomas
Pröpper, vol. 2,1351-1436. Freiburg: Herder.
Flynn, Leo. 1938. Billuart and his Summa Sancti Thomae. London.
Hentrich, Wilhelm. 1928. Gregor von Valencia und der Molinismus. Innsbruck: Rauch.
Hübener, Wolfgang. 1989. “Praedeterminatio physica.” In Historisches Wörterbuch der
Philosophie, vol. 7,1216-1225. Basel: Schwabe.
PROVIDENCE, PREDESTINATION, AND GRACE IO3
Knebel, Sven K. 2007. “Einleitung zu: Diego del Mármol S. J., Tractatus de auxilio effi-
caci divinae gratiae, ec eius cum libero arbitrio creato concordia.” In Die scholastische
Theologie im Zeitalter der Gnadenstreitigkeiten, edited by Ulrich L. Lehner, vol. 1, 9-54.
Nordhausen: Bautz.
Knebel, Sven K. 1991. “Scientia media: Ein diskursarchäologischer Leitfaden durch das 17.
Jahrhundert.” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 34:262-294.
Knebel, Sven K. 2011. Suarezismus. Erkenntnistheoretisches aus dem Nachlass des
Jesuitengenerals Tirso González de Santalla, 1624-1705: Abhandlung und Edition.
Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.
Knebel, Sven K. 2000. Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Das System der moralischen
Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik, 1550-1700. Paradeigmata 21. Hamburg: Meiner.
Le Bachelet, Xavier-Marie. 1931. Prédestination et grâce efficace. Controverses dans la Compagnie
de Jesus au temps dAquaviva, 1610-1613. 1 vols. Louvain: Museum Lessianum.
Lurz, Wilhelm. 1932. Adam Tanner SJ (t 1632) und die Gnadenstreitigkeiten des 17. Jahrhunderts.
Breslau: Müller & Seiffert.
Marschler, Thomas. 2013. “Verbindungen zwischen Gesetzestraktat und Gotteslehre bei
Francisco Suárez im Begriff der lex aeterna.” In Auctoritas omnium legume: Francisco Suárez'
“De Legibus”zwischen Theologie, Philosophie und Jurisprudenz, edited by Oliver Bach, Norbert
Brieskorn, and Gideon Stiening, 27-51. Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
Molina, Luis de, SJ. 1953. Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, provi-
dentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione, ad nonnullos primae partis D. Thomae artículos,
edited by Johannes Rabeneck. Oniae: Collegium Maximum.
Ocaña García, Marcelino. 2000. Molinismo y libertad. Córdoba: Publ. Obra Social y Cultural
Cajasur.
Pastor, Ludwig von. 1927. Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter der katholischen Restauration und
des Dreißigjährigen Krieges: Leo XI und Paul V (1605-1621). Freiburg: Herder.
Perszyk, Ken, ed. 2012. Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ramelow, Tilman. 1997. Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl: Die Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen
A. Perez SJ (1599-1649) und G. W Leibniz (1646-1716). Brills Studies in Intellectual History
72. Leiden, New York and Köln: Brill.
Reinhardt, Klaus. 1965. Pedro Luis SJ (1538-1602) und sein Verständnis der Kontingenz,
Praescienz und Praedestination. Portugiesische Forschungen der Görres-Gesellschaft,
Zweite Reihe, Bd. 2. Münster: Aschendorff.
Schneemann, Gerhard. 1881. Controversiarum de divinaegratiae liberique arbitrii concordia ini­
tia et progressas. Freiburg: Herder.
Scorraille, Raoul deSJ. 1917. El P. Francisco Suárez de la Compañía de Jesús. 2 vols. Barcelona:
Subirana.
Stegmüller, Friedrich. 1935. Geschichte des Molinismus I: Neue Molinaschriften. Münster:
Aschendorff.
Stegmüller, Friedrich, i960. “Gnadenstreit.” In Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche. 2nd ed., vol. 4,
1002-1007. Freiburg: Herder.
Stiglmayr, Emmerich. 1964. Verstoßung und Gnade. Die Universalität der hinreichenden Gnade
und die strengen Thomisten des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts. Roma: Herder.
Suárez, Francisco, SJ. (1856-1878). Opera omnia. 28 vols. Paris: Vivès.
